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Abstract 
The contemporary relationship between Africa and Europe, is not just that between two 
sovereign and ostensibly equal partners, but also very enormous and significant for the 
survival of the two continents; quite unlike in the past when it was that of the master and 
labourer-the labourer providing for the master’s survival-from slavery to colonialism and 
neo-colonialism: developments that bred deep-seated resentment and racial contempt. 
This paper takes a critical look at the new intense economic relationship between Europe 
and sub-Saharan Africa and appraises this with the view of determining whether the 
developments are new measures to appease Africa for the centuries of plunder, and 
cement Euro-African relationship; or whether they are just another set of strategies to 
further create a stranglehold on the continent economically and make it perpetually 
dependent. Indeed, the paper accomplishes its task by x-raying the influx and intense 
activities, in Nigeria, of MNCs and foreign investors which, to many Third World 
scholars, are effective instruments of neo-colonization. The paper looks at the 
implications of the new relationships for national development and concludes that the 
European presence is for meaningful partnership, but at the same time exploitative. The 
relationship has however increased the Nigerian government’s confidence in European 
business in Africa. But has it done the same for an average Nigerian, has it erased the 
horrific memories of the African past? 
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Introduction 
In the pre-colonial and colonial times in Africa, Europeans wrote that Africa had no past 
“because it belonged in the unhistorical part of the world,” that it was a benighted 
continent and its past was predominantly darkness, “and darkness has no place in 
history.” Moreover, Africa could not have had a history because it had no culture of 
writing and “history begins only when men take to writing” (Roper, 1976; Newton, cited 
in Fage 2002; Lugard, 1965). 
 These lines of thought constituted the patterns of Afro-European relations in the 18th and 
19th century, which particularly reinforced the justification for imperialism and 
colonization of the time. Trans-Atlantic slave trade thus paved way for the floodgate of 
colonial plunder and the institutioning of a master-servant relationship between 
Europe/West and Africa. In recent times, post-colonial Africa has been demanding 
reparations from Europe for over 600 years of exploitation and economic enslavement, 
which Europe and the West seem to have responded to by its many developmental 
projects, investment, financial aid and other forms of beneficial partnerships with the 
continent. More importantly, there has been an upsurge of Multinational 
Companies(MNCs) or Transnational Companies(TNCs) in the vital sectors of the African 
economy. For Nigeria, the oil sector is crowded with multinational companies from 
Europe and America, but these companies are responsible for prospecting and extraction 
of crude for export, without whom the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation would 
only remain a mere government parastatal.  
This development supports the paradigm that MNCs are positive intervening variables in 
the Nigerian economy, and that indeed, as a result of their contributions to national 
 4 
development, they are remedying the unjust past of Europe towards Africa. However, 
another school of thought is the Afrocentric perspective that on no account will 
capitalism become humane and generous: that foreign investments, MNCs and financial 
assistance are not reparations, but are neo-colonial perfections of the construction of 
inequality and exploitation of resources as was the case. It is these two contrasting 
perspectives that this paper is comparing and using to examine activities of Europeans 
and Western MNCs in the post-colonial Nigerian State. 
  
Post-Slave Trade: MNCs in Colonial Nigeria 
Modern multinational corporations have their roots in the traders of the mercantilist era 
of the 16th-17th century, who constituted instruments of colonialism. Their activities 
opened up the local economies, increased volume of international trade, expanded the 
western economies to other continents and increased contacts among the peoples of the 
world (Buckley, 2003). The 19th century was to mark a turning point as the Industrial 
Revolution not only changed the socio-political ecology in Europe, but also accentuated 
expansion and acquisition of lands, territories, search for raw materials and quest to 
establish external markets to take care of the excesses, and new investment climates for 
surplus capital(Hobson, 1938). This explicates colonialism. It is however important to 
note that the process of colonization was aided and ultimately completed by the foreign 
companies that were established in the areas of “effective occupation” before and after 
the conference of 1884-85 in Germany. 
The Royal Niger Company in Nigeria for instance, had the objective to paint the areas 
along the Niger River “red” under Taubman Goldie. The commercial and economic 
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conquests of the RNC soon translated into the formal establishment of political control in 
Nigeria for Great Britain(Hopkins, 1973). The same went for other companies that 
concentrated in the economically flourishing southern part of Nigeria, including United 
Trading Company, United African Company(two descendants of the RNC) and others. 
By 1945, a number of British companies had become very active in colonial Nigeria, and 
conglomerates between Britain, France ,US and Holland had also emerged on the 
nation’s economic space. This development, as the pre-colonial one formed the 
background to the advent and activities of MNCs in Nigeria.  
The discovery of oil in Nigeria during colonial rule and its extraction in commercial and 
exportable quantity from the 1950s attracted a monumental turn out of foreign 
stakeholders in the oil enterprise. The other areas that have attracted multinational 
companies over the years include agricultural, automobile, beverage, manufacturing, 
music, construction, aviation and telecommunication industries. The immediate variable 
to explain this explosion of MNCs is the fertile market Nigeria represents for the world 
because of its veritably active consumer population and the abundance of raw materials 
with which to operate(Olagbaju, J. and Falola, T. 1996). This paper attempts to examine 
the implications of the outburst of MNCs’ activities in Nigeria’s economic progress. 
 
Agents of National Development: Myth or Reality 
The mid-19th century saw the emergence of international corporations. It was an 
entrepreneurial joint-stock company, organized in simple hub-and-spoke networks that 
that established and controlled international trade routes, relying on its home-country’s 
military protection, to import raw materials and export finished products(Anderson and 
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Cavanaugh, 2000). The intensification of imperialism after the revolution in industry in 
Europe, led to an explosion of international communication, trade carried out by 
international corporations or multinational corporations and gradual process of  creation 
of similar economic patterns, identities and systems(Biersteker, 1998). The creation of 
similarities were rather involuntary, as it was the manifestation of the concentration of 
production and financial capital to such level that it led to monopolies through the merger 
of banks and banking capital, what Lenin(1966)calls financial combines, that culminated 
in financial oligarchies.  
MNCs from 1900 established foreign operations to secure sources of raw materials, and 
developing countries were the largest recipients of worldwide foreign direct investment 
by virtue of colonial institutions in place at the time and the expansive nature of western 
influences as a result. Large US corporations began to invest in Europe, mainly in 
manufacturing. Investment in other nations by European and Japanese businesses soon 
followed in the 1950s and 60s; but the service sector received a boost in the 1980s 
and1990s, showing a marked expansion in the operations of MNCs to other areas of life 
arising from post World War 11 reconstruction. For instance, where the FDI in 
developing countries was 60% before 1939 and it dropped as a result of post war 
development in Europe to 25%, it jumped to 40% in the mid-1990s because of improving 
economic conditions in the Third World and relative political stability. A good instance 
was the Lever Brothers(now Unilever) that operated in ninety countries with over 500 
service companies(ILO, 1997). 
While technological revolution explains the intensity of MNC operations globally, 
auspicious political and economic clime, coupled with the natural tendencies for capital 
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to keep expanding, account for the globalization of western-oriented MNCs. 
Goldstein(2001) attests to this by positing that in addition to the direct connection among 
members of a single MNC, the operations of MNCs have supported the emergence of a 
global business infrastructure connecting a transnational community of business people. 
   For Pearson and Payalslian(1999), MNCs have been the principal vehicles towards the 
globalization of the international economy. Though they submit that globalization reveals 
major weaknesses in MNC structure and operations, greater trade liberalization and 
market deregulation widened the realm for MNCs operations and as they opted for 
greater decentralization, spreading their management structures across continents within a 
vast maze of expansive communication network. MNCs are therefore promoting 
economic structure: capitalism and free trade, which is today a feature of national 
economies. Their influences are breaking barriers of high tariff and high cost of 
transportation such that encourages the penetration of borders on a large scale merging 
economies globally. Put differently, a transnational mechanism is created which 
facilitates greater international cooperation and functional integration, .i.e., globalizing 
the world economies into one market, particularly after the fall of communism. Others 
that have shared in this integrative theory include Balaam and Vaseth(2005), J.S. 
Palminaso(2006) and M.G. Quinlivan(2001).   
Barring all supposed integrative functions of multinationals in global economy, it is 
increasingly evident that multinational corporations are agents of globalization of western 
capital. Their intent is for the home-country, but the development it brings along with it 
for the developing country is happenstance: we must not lose our perspective-
multinational companies are profiteering ventures that seek consolidation of capital. The 
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integrative dimension is for the purpose of gaining access and hold for home-country: it 
is indeed the completion of  unipolar hegemony, which probably found space after the 
cold war. Like colonial economic and political institutions tended to integrate rural and 
urban centres and societies and states for  administrative convenience and economic 
exploitation, so are MNCs catalyzing western hold on Third World economies and 
extending colonial rule by economic means(Risse, 2005). 
Further, MNCs and their neocolonial nature in Africa and the Third World have created 
certain fundamental structural imbalances in the state. The “entrepreneurial” privileged 
class in indigenous business who partner with the MNCs and foreign contractors, have 
emerged as the rich-few in whose hands the economic destiny of Africa is placed; and 
who are more likely to utilize the vantages of economic power for favourable policy 
outcomes and indeed control of political power. 
As a corollary to the foregoing, the imbalances extend-or become visible-in the 
North/South dialogue. MNCs’ exploitative activities and integrative tendencies construct 
inequalities between developed North and developing South. The reason is that the latter 
perpetually depends on the former for economic leverage and preservation. This is a 
dependency situation that manifests in an international interdependence characterized by 
extreme power imbalance. The satellite enclave to which capital is exported witnesses 
strains and distortions in its historical trend of changes and continuities, increase in the 
exploitation of labour, plunder of natural resources and ruin of small producers and 
ultimately the territorial division of the world into two unequal blocs, namely the 
metropole and the satellite, centre and periphery, developed and developing countries, 
North and South(Maxfield, 2003). 
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Having established the strength and weakness of MNCs in global political economy, it is 
only pertinent to examine the peculiarities of the Nigerian experience from independence 
to date. The paper identifies that the MNCs are vehicles of change, but they are not 
essentially agents of national development nor do they represent reparation because the 
new Euro/Western-African economic partnerships are mutually beneficial and most 
times, to the West. The projects awarded to foreign contractors gulp huge money and yet 
fade out or do not see light of the day, just as the foreign investors are looking for surplus 
and large markets and good sources of raw materials where such surplus capital is re-
invested for yet, greater surplus (Ake,  1981). 
 
MNCs, Investments and the Nigeria State 
Popular theories used to explicate the erosion of Nigeria into infamous pantheons from 
the 1980s have been underdevelopment or lack of it, poor administration of policy and 
policy regimes, inefficient implementation of ideas and policy actions, political 
instability, etc., the pressures of neocolonial structures as the MNCs are often 
underplayed. They have become regular government “guests”(Folarin, 2006) whose 
multifarious activities have rather quickened the failure of the Nigerian state than 
expected. For instance, their activities in the oil sector have increased environmental 
endangerment that has  fuelled ethnic crisis in the Niger Delta; and dangerously, political 
corruption resulting from contract deals has escalated. 
The aforementioned factors may constitute the latent but immediate factor in the crisis of 
economic development; the discovery and expropriation of oil in exportable quantity in 
Nigeria heightened the crisis of development. It also constructed a new kind of 
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immorality in public circles and among privileged individuals in the corridors of power, 
which was characterized by official bribery, “contractocracy,” that found space in the 
contraption of squandermania. For instance, after the oil boom of the civil war, money 
was no longer the problem, “but how to spend it,” a philosophical anomaly that 
engendered rot in the public and private sectors(Olukoshi, 1991:25-35). This pervasive 
situation created a new scenario in which emergency contractors and MNCs emerged not 
to be left out in the interminable squandering attendant with nation-building. The 
economic consequence has been the prohibitive cost of governance. Egekhwaide and 
Ogunkola(2001). 
The exploitative tendencies of transnational or multinational companies in Nigeria have 
not only impacted on cost of governance but also on its nationhood. The MNCs have 
enjoyed unbridled relationship with the surrogates in government- military or civilian- 
who have always used the wealth from the oil in the South to implement failed projects 
through “jumbo contracts” awarded to MNCs and their local collaborators. while the 
source[oil-producing states] languish in perpetual squalor and ecological degradation as a 
result of activities of the foreign oil companies. This has soured inter-group relations and 
caused restiveness among the people of the South-South. There have been the cases of 
Isaac Boro who led the first “secession” in the early 1960s, Movement for the Survival of 
the Ogoni People(MOSOP) of the late Ken Saro-Wiwa, and Niger Delta Peoples 
Volunteer Force(NDPVF) led by Asari Dokubo to mention a few. Recently, a peaceful 
protest over unresolved matters on revenue allocation to the Niger Delta states was made 
by south-south delegates to the national reform conference (N.P.R.C) who marched out 
and refused to continue in the conference going on in Abuja. These are delicate matters 
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threatening the fragile corporate existence of Nigeria, and which find answers in 
rethinking both the running of the state and the activities of MNC’s in the treasure bases. 
   This paper, from the discourse above, essentially looks at two crucial factors in 
Nigeria’s economic stagnation namely, the wasteful, white elephant projects with the 
foreign contracting firms winning the bids for completed or uncompleted projects like the 
Ajaokuta steel (rolling) mill, Lagos Metroline, building of whole cities like Abuja, roads, 
bridges, dams, houses, stadiums, office complexes, hotels, schools, hospitals, railways, 
vehicle manufacturing, etc., which have been the country’s hugest drainpipes. Secondly, 
and related to the first, are the MNC’s like the oil companies and multipurpose 
construction companies such as Feugerolle, Strabag, Julius Berger, etc, who, in 
collaboration with “government businessmen”, embark on endless constructions or very 
expensive contracts (Akinterinwa, 1999). 
Scholars like Ikime(1985), Meier,(2000), Awolowo(1966) and Osoba(1993) have 
separately argued that Nigeria is a failed project. It was activities of expatriate or  
colonial economic profiteers that began the capitally- intensive project called Nigeria. 
The story of Nigeria dates back to the 19th century when British expeditionists, 
particularly the trading company led by Taubman Goldie’s Royal Niger Company, had 
sufficiently “painted the area red” in Her Majesty’s interest ahead of other colonial 
powers in the west coast of Africa. Granted effective occupation like other European 
imperialists in the Berlin settlement of 1885, Goldie’s RNC and the British forces 
managed to bring the area under British economic control and consequently, colonial 
rule. Interestingly, the peoples of the different areas had separate systems of government, 
differences in heritage and different worldviews. Indeed, they only related economically 
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with one another as independent kingdoms and states before colonial rule. The act of 
bringing these peoples together through mergers, for mere colonial administrative 
convenience and economic exploitation, was the beginning of failed projects and by 
extension, the cyclic motion of Nigeria’s economic stagnation(Folarin, 2006:16).  
Tied to the aprons of external forces for survival, which had become a belief since 1914, 
with no attendant sense of commitment or patriotism because “Nigeria” did not emerge 
of the peoples freewill, it had been the incidence of one group out-smarting the other to 
conscript expatriates in looting the funds (Osoba, 1993:52). Consequently, there had been 
among Nigerian groups the quest to monopolize power so as to monopolize resources to 
benefit the “self” or the group, and the foreign partners that aid them to do so because of 
the prospects in the Nigerian goldmine-whether agricultural as it was up to the 1960’s, 
other minerals as it had been from the 1920’s to the 1970’s, or oil mineral as it has been 
from the 1970’s to date. Nigeria’s over-reliance on foreign direct investment (whether 
genuinely for development or otherwise) explains the high share of foreign capital with 
little for Nigeria itself. In the years 1960-1975 for instance, the most significant problem 
of Nigerian industrial development was the high share of foreign capital investment. 
Olayide (1976:64) observes that in 1965 for instance out of a paid up capital  of about 
N128m for the entire country, about 61% fell to private investment from abroad; 12% to 
Nigerian private investment and the remaining 27% to Nigerian government. 
There was also the problem of high percentage of foreign ownership and control, which 
started in the late 1960’s up till the  indigenization policy of 1974, but which has come up 
again in recent times. Prior to 1974, foreign investors had almost exclusive controlling 
interest in such important industries as Tobacco, chemical products, plastic products, 
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fabricated metal products, electrical machinery and transport equipment. Most of these 
industries are capital intensive. Foreign participation also exceeded 50% in the paid-up 
capital  of textile, food, beverages, rubber, leather and furniture industries prior to the 
indigenization (Olayide, 64). With protection, guarantee and subsidy from the Nigerian 
state, MNC’s, previously involved mainly in import-export trade, began to increasingly 
attracted to some productive activities of import-substitution industrialization. The 
Nigerian state at federal and regional levels as well as Nigerian private individuals and 
enterprises collaborated  with foreign companies and investors in promoting the 
establishment of import-substitution industries, with all the capital, machinery, technical 
and managerial and organizational skills  coming from abroad. (MAMSER,1987:38). The 
consequence was the promotion of more production and employment in European and 
American economies than Nigeria. The dependent capitalist economy of post-colonial 
Nigeria was also consolidated in the process. Thirdly, it naturally led to domestic 
disarticulation exemplified by peasant and petty commodity production and the 
abandonment of the rural areas, which were even the source of resources, for the urban 
centers. 
In 1987, MAMSER noted that foreign domination and control of major investment 
activities and the consequent repatriation of politics, dividends and interests, inhibited  
domestic accumulation and re-investment of capital  by Nigerian entrepreneurs because 
they lacked adequate resources  to compete with multi-national companies. As a result, 
indigenous entrepreneurs became middlemen, distributive agents or intermediaries 
between foreign interests and the larger Nigerian society and economy. 
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The post-civil war economy in Nigeria was aggressively reconstructive and essentially 
developmental with the oil boom at its disposal to make these realistic. The objective 
manifested in three national development plans between 1970 and 1985, which were 
documented in the 1979 constitution (Olaniyan, 1988). As earlier noted however, the oil 
boom and the well intended national development plans rather produced local and foreign 
gold diggers who saw Nigeria as the new gold mine in Africa to whom their fortune-
seeking binoculars and attention must turn. The genuine opportunities provided for 
Nigeria to take off to the level of a developed country were dashed by a combination of 
hurried and reckless execution of planning, bureaucratic corruption, several grandiose 
and white elephant projects being undertaken at the same time, emergency contractors 
and ten percenters arising in their number, incompetent but exploitative MNC’s and 
investors trooping in to get the jobs. The opportunities were wasted. Revenue was 
lavished on unviable and grandiose projects which were purely conceived and almost all 
contracts were grossly inflated. A telecommunications contract worth several hundreds of 
millions of dollars was awarded to the international telephone and telegraph (ITT) by 
Muritala Mohammed, Gowon’s commissioner for works at the time. The ITT chief in 
Africa, M.K.O. Abiola, was Mohammed’s personal friend and business partner (Osoba, 
1993:52) and the contract given the American company (ITT) was bogus indeed as its 
task of developing the telecommunications system (telephone, telegraph, etc) to a world 
standard, was no more than a small improvement on the existing colonial one and that 
sector, only four years ago, since the early 1970’s, witnessed a revolution. 
A major instance of positively effective impact of MNCs in Nigeria was the special 
relationship government went into with Peugeot Automobile France to transfer the 
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Peugeot automobile technology to Nigeria, first by opening an assembly plant and 
building for government uses, Peugeot 504 salon cars., and ultimately for manufacturing 
such here from the abundance of iron and tin-ore in the country. Consequently, all 
government functionaries from the middle to the top levels, civilians and military, were 
entitled to the cars for official and private issues, which were cheaply procured by hire 
purchase or direct car loans. Soon, the Peugeot Automobile Nigeria (PAN) in Kaduna 
began massive production with the Nigerian market glutted by Peugeot brands and the 
entire society used to them. Ironically as expected, a culture of consumption rather than 
production became entrenched and the object of technology transfer became absolutely 
defeated. Today, Nigerians’ taste for consumption has reached an all-time high, with the 
three classes, the poor middle-class and rich going for ranges of tokunbo (imported fairly 
used) cars befitting their classes. 
Many of the concrete post-civil war projects were characteristically over-ambitious, 
poorly planned and executed, corruptly over-costed, politically motivated, ethnically or 
sectionally located and  inevitably wasteful and unsuccessful. Classic instances include 
the Liquefied Natural Gas projects, the steel mills and the steel rolling mills. One project 
that has found Nigeria’s  wealth generously shared among European expatriates and 
Nigerian technical personnel, workers and politicians alike, is the Ajaokuta steel 
company (now steel rolling mill), with hundreds of millions of US dollars invested in it 
from the mid 1970’s,  abandoned several times and revived again. Its first production a 
couple of months ago, was actually still a test-production. Yet this project, in the Third 
National Development Plan period alone (1975-1980) received over N1billion 
representing 22.5%  of the aggregate projected in industry (Olayide: 72). Again, in what 
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seemed a politically and sectionally located move, a refinery in the oil sector, was built in 
Kaduna, Northern Nigeria. Oil pipes from the seas in the Niger Delta passing crude, 
reached the refinery. This was an ambitious and unnecessary project, which, like other 
federal character-motivated projects, had resulted in sheer wastages. 
The oil sector has been the worst hit. Aside the fact that sudden oil wealth was the cause 
of the general social and economic immorality, accentuated by the white elephants and 
over-billed contracts, the sector attracted two things from the MNCs. First, more MNCs 
came into the country, including those whose focus was not oil hitherto. Existing 
countries in Nigeria “diversified” into the oil sector and the industry of prospecting, 
exploration, lifting of crude and sale of refined oil boomed from them. With their 
collaborators in government, Shell, Agip, Total, Unipetrol, with the support of their home 
countries and headquarters abroad, and to whom the profits will go, the Nigerian market 
became a booming one. In recent years, Chevron, Elf (now with Total), Mobil, Texaco 
and small scale indigenous (petrol) companies have joined in the second stage of the oil 
boom. 
Second, Nigeria, with its huge oil companies, provided a good market in which the 
MNC’s could concentrate part of their effort to expand their sales. The MNC’s therefore 
offered contractor finance/suppliers credits of all types to state governments and their 
parastatals. Also, they stepped up, through these trading subsidiaries or local companies 
or agents, exploitation of consumer goods to Nigeria, thereby exacerbating the problem 
of reconciling social surplus with investment (cf Olukoshi,28). Apart from the deepening 
crisis of exploitation by the MNC’s and their role in the jumbo contracts and white 
elephants; in addition, foreign oil companies operating in Nigeria have been generally 
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insensitive to the problems, particularly environmental challenges of their host 
communities (Agbodike,1990:175). 
Other over-ambitious, over-costed and wasteful projects in the political, social and 
infrastructural sectors included the Universal Primary Education, the Federal Capital 
Territory, the jumbo salary awards, the agricultural policies such as OFN and Green 
Revolution; some airports, some institutions of higher learning, Lagos metroline project, 
Better Life Project, Family Support Programme, and so forth. After having taking off 
with much pomp and canopy involving huge capital, the UPE scheme of 1976 soon 
collapsed because of corruption and bad implementation. In 1977, seven new federal 
universities were created and there was a drastic reduction in the tuition and boarding 
fees of tertiary institutions (Osoba,52). The reversal of this decision six months later 
because of its wastefulness, hitherto not considered before the decision, culminated in the 
“calamitous consequences that have gone down in history as the ‘Ali Must Go’ crisis.” 
   Many project contracted to foreign firms had been wasteful and poorly completed or 
uncompleted; but the most extravagant contractual projects, Osoba(1993:52) claims that 
none has been more absurd than the federal capital project in Abuja, “a veritable 
bottomless pit which successive governments continue to dump the dwindling wealth of 
the nation.” From the Abuja contracts, small and big foreign contractors, construction 
MNC’s with their local partners, made huge fortunes. Among them were Fougerolle, 
Dumez (both French companies) and Julius Berger (a German company) to mention just 
a few. Some made easy and big profits, and some were outrightly fraudulent. It is on 
record that Dumez was not only able to have 80% of its working capital[worldwide], but 
also 180% of its profit from Nigeria (Akinterinwa,135). This shows that it exists almost 
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entirely because of the juicy contracts of construction in Nigeria. According to 
Akinterinwa (154) French companies, which got most of the Abuja contracts by the end 
of 1980, appeared to have secured their contracts by the French strategy of “settlement”, 
“ten percent” or kick-backs. The Uwaifo investigation panel revealed that Fougerolle 
paid N21.8million in return for obtaining a contract of N329million from the Shagari 
administration. The Julius Berger company, which was the favourite of the Babangida 
regime, also reportedly paid as much as 1million US dollars each year as kick-backs to 
President Babangida himself in its billions of dollars contracts of roads, complexes and 
structures construction in Abuja (and its construction of such elsewhere like the Third 
Mainland bridge in Lagos). 
While 100% of all the money for Abuja contracts, and the road networks, bridges, 
institutions, stadiums, refineries, ports, etc., was and still coming from oil, the same 
factor has sparked off a culture of importation in the course of which ports have become 
congested and the country has had to pay a fortune on demurrage. All interests have 
converged on the appropriation and consumption of oil revenues and the phenomenon of 
abandoned mountains of bags of imported fertilizers and cement, machinery worth 
millions of naira left rusting away in open fields, and newly built tarred roads by Julius 
Berger, Strabag, Cappa and D’Alberto, etc., washed away by the first rainfall, and many 
other colossal wastes have become familiar in the country. (MAMSER: 40). 
 
MNCs and Nigeria’s Huge Projects Bill 
Successive regimes have demonstrated unquantifiable amounts of wastes through 
unfocussed policies. One of such cases of good but wasted or mismanaged initiatives by 
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the Nigerian government was the N30b Third National Development Plan of 1975-80. 
This era witnessed the critical lose of much fund to “white elephants” and MNC’s. In the 
allocations of that period, the private sector participation stood at N10billion of the total 
planned expenditure(Ojiako, ND) with MNCs and foreign investors constituting 95% of 
that sector. Even the Nigerian Enterprises (amendment) Decree of 1977 could not stop 
that. The remaining N20billion was devoted to post-war economic consolidation through 
over-ambitious projects and jumbo contracts. Thus about N25billion of the total capital 
was wasted as it brought little or no development to Nigeria. What appeared like 
development such as universities, refineries, roads, etc were either ill-timed or hurriedly 
put together, but were certainly drainpipes for embezzlement and exploitation. One of the 
seeming landmarks in the agriculture sector of the third national development plan was 
Obasanjo’s Operation Feed the Nation which began in 1976 and whose aim was,  
to make this nation self sufficient in basic food needs 
during this cropping season. It also hoped that the 
operation will impart to the whole country a new sense of 
purpose and bring home to the need for self reliance. 
Suffice it to say that the substantial part of N2.2 billion devoted to the OFN was a 
colossal national waste as OFN was just a famous name that did not meet its objectives of 
a return to rural large scale farming, agricultural revolution, or alleviation of the food 
crisis. 
The failure of the project was underscored by the instituting of the Green Revolution of 
the Shehu Shagari administration, which also failed. The Shehu Shagari administration 
reviewed the import rules imposed by the military, removing most of the restriction to 
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assist local and foreign individualists in importing needed materials in the drive towards 
rapid industrialization (Olaniyan, 1988). The development and use of local raw materials 
was thus discouraged, and the import substitution once again reinforced Nigeria’s 
dependence on external sources with the traditional strains and stresses on foreign 
exchange and balance of payments. Several things followed, coupled with the global 
economic recession from which Nigeria greatly suffered. 
The Babangida administration attempted to right the inherent wrongs in the previous 
economic reform programmes by the introduction and implementation of SAP. The 
administration opened the economy with the programme, which almost for greater 
deregulation, which meant increased private participation in the economy, particularly the 
oil sector, than it was done by either the Obasanjo regime or Shagari administration. 
Babangida (1989) himself declared that the previous Nigerian enterprises promotion 
decree was not suitable for the desired inflow of foreign investment in the country. There 
was greater participation of MNC’s between 1987 and 1993 in the oil, building and 
banking sectors. Julius Berger swept more than 90% of the contracts for the physical 
development of Abuja alone. Of all the regimes that pumped money into the FCT it is 
believed and has been reported that the administration sunk the highest billions of dollars. 
   The administration also initiated rural and urban economic recovery programmes such 
as the Better Life for Rural Dwellers(later christened BLP), Directorate of Food, Road 
and Rural Infrastructures (DFRRI), National Directorate of Employment(NDE), etc., 
which were noble projects but soon written off after take off because of weak institutions 
to make them invulnerable to political manipulations and corruption. Further, bodies like 
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the BLP ennobled the institution of the First Lady which created a kind of conjugal 
dictatorship(Adesina and Folarin, 2000). 
There was an economic setback for Nigeria however from 1994-98 as it was isolated 
diplomatically because of the unpopular dictatorship of Sani Abacha. The political crisis 
and diplomatic row with the international community naturally discouraged foreign 
investment in Nigeria because it was considered unsafe for investment. However, 
because of stakes in oil and the Nigerian oil industry in particular, the multinationals in 
the oil sector remained and found a favourable policy and protectionist disposition 
towards them by the isolated Abacha junta, which found the oil MNCs, particularly Shell, 
as the only foreign “assets” left in the pariah state. The regime also initiated the Family 
Support Programme, another elaborate pet project in replacement of the now defunct 
BLP, headed by his wife, the First Lady. 
The second coming of Obasanjo in 1999 has been more tactful and corrective of his first 
project failures. First, as argued elsewhere(Folarin,2006:12) it is careful about white 
elephant projects and jumbo contracts, but not without making “white elephant promises” 
about electricity and poverty eradication which have failed on several occasions. Second, 
the deregulation that has been heightened has more local players taking over the economy 
and competing favourably with the ever active foreign players, including the MNC’s. 
Third, the government has introduced a new policy in which contractors can no longer 
get upfront payments but would have taken the project to a high degree before some 
percentage of funds can be released. Fourthly, some of the failed projects of the past have 
been revived and it is to this administration’s credit that Ajaokuta steel mill started 
anything meaningful in thirty years by test-producing. Lastly, the culture of wastages 
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engendered by corruption and planlessness is gradually being arrested, which is restoring 
some integrity to government. The administration is also accused of creating what Frantz 
Fanon(1963) would probably have called petit MNCs such as the Dangotes and the likes 
that have created business and financial monopolies in Nigeria and in collaboration of 
western economic empires. 
 
MNCs, Foreign Investors and Euro-African Partnership: Reparation or Re-
colonization? 
Multinational companies may have acted as agents of change, development and 
integration; but they have always left behind selective changes and relative development 
and a yawning gap between the metropolitan powers which they serve and which service 
them, and the post-colonial state in Africa. For Nigeria, while we can appreciate the 
depth of capital investment in the economy, which has inadvertently brought Nigeria into 
the mainstream of global capital; we can count our blessings, meaning the fruits of FDI 
are as infinitesimal as they are insignificant, despite Nigeria’s front running position in 
African economic recovery through partnership with western oligarchs and an aggressive 
drive to open up for foreign direct investment. 
Marxists, including Marx(1999), Lenin(1977), Rodney(1981), Fanon(1963), etc, and 
liberal scholars such as Hobson (1902), Morgenthau (2006), etc and even Africanist 
thinkers like Ake(1981), Ade-Ajayi (1962) and Davidson(1993) do not believe that 
capitalism has any place for reparation; if not only accumulation upon accumulation as 
exemplified by slave trade, colonialism and neo-colonialism successively. Self-
preservation, enlightened self-interest, power and profiteering per time characterize 
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capitalism at all levels-rudimentary to full-blown; and as such, the enormous activities of 
European and Western investors and companies in Nigeria and Africa are developmental 
to the extent that changes and modernity are engendered, but the long-term effects are 
contradictory of African expectations. For instance, the Shell Petroleum Development 
Company(SPDC), an Euro-American conglomerate’ activities in the Niger Delta of 
Nigeria are far below compensatory of the ills of the pre and post colonial past, but have 
created new ethnic and environmental problems and accentuated the rate, pace and 
measure of post colonial exploitation. The government’s protectionist policy towards 
Shell and other Euro-American companies in Nigeria have cemented the Afro-Western 
relations at the governmental level, without a desirable impact on the perception of the 
West by an ordinary Nigerian. Indeed, the role of the West in the creation or escalation of 
conflict in Rwanda, former Zaire, Cote d’Voire, Liberia, Angola, to mention a few, for 
the purpose of fulfilling business or economic interest, or as a result of lack of tangible 
business interest in such places, are far from acts of recourse to penitence, restitution or 
reparation, as the case may be, towards Africa.  
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